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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC., ] 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) 
THE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION ; 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, ; 
and THE UTAH STATE TAX ; 
COMMISSION, ; 
Respondents. ] 
I Appellate Court No. 20020904-CA 
1 Tax Commission Appeal 
) No. 02-1435 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER/APPELLANT 
On Petition for Writ of Review of the Utah State Tax Commission's 
Final Decision in Appeal No. 98-0707 
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Petitioner/Appellant Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("ATK") submits the following Brief of 
Petitioner on ATK's Petition for Writ of Review of the Amended Order Granting Motion 
to Dismiss, which the Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission") issued on 
October 28, 2002 in favor of Respondent/Appellee Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization (the "Board"). A copy of the Amended Order is attached as Addendum A. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction to review final decisions of 
formal adjudicative proceedings originating with the Tax Commission pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) and 59-1-602(1). The Utah Supreme Court assigned this 
case to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
There being no dispute as to any material fact, the issues for review before this 
Court are exclusively legal. 
ISSUE I: 
Did the Board violate Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) by failing to notify the 
"taxpayer," in this instance ATK and its counsel as ATK's designated, Board-required 
agent, of the Board's April 11, 2002 decisions on ATK's protest of the assessed value of 
those property parcels listed in Addendum B? 
ISSUE II: 
Did the Board violate ATK's "due process" rights, as secured by Amendment XIV 
of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, by 
failing to notify ATK's counsel as the designated, Board-required agent of the Board's 




Did the Board violate its own rules by failing to notify the United States Navy, 
which is the "owner" of five parcels shown in Addendum B, and upon whose assessed 
values ATK paid a "privilege tax," of the Board's April 11, 2002 decisions on ATK's 
protest of the assessed value of such parcels? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
When reviewing the Tax Commission's Amended Order, the Court of Appeals or 
the Supreme Court shall grant the Tax Commission no deference concerning its 
conclusions of law. Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b). 
APPLICABLE STATUTES, RULES AND CASE LAW 
• United States Constitution, Amendment XI, Section 1 
("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.") 
• Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7 ("No person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law.") 
• Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) (directing the "clerk 
of the board" to notify the "taxpayer" of the Board's decision) 
• Salt Lake County Board of Equalization "Instructions" 
("additional agent or representative information: required 
(unless on file and current with the clerk of the board of 
equalization")(emphasis added). 
• Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306 (1950) (establishing "adequate notice" and 
"meaningful opportunity to be heard" as the constitutional 
standard; invalidating a New York law that permitted banks 
to give its periodic reports to investors by publishing those 
reports in the newspapers). 
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• Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 
485 U.S. 478 (1988)(invalidating an Oklahoma statute that 
denied actual notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 
to estate creditors). 
• Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 
(1983)(invalidating state notice statute that did not provide 
actual notice to mortgagee lienholders on delinquent property 
taxes). 
• In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996)(holding that 
judges received insufficient notice of the charges against 
them in violation of "due process") 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of Proceedings 
ATK petitions this Court for review of the Tax Commission's Amended Order 
Granting [the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization's] Motion to Dismiss ATK's 
appeal to the Tax Commission of the Board's April 11, 2002 decisions from ATK's 
protests of the January 1, 2001 assessed values of the parcels listed in Addendum B. 
2. Disposition of Agency 
By Amended Order dated October 28, 2002, the Tax Commission dismissed 
ATK's appeals of the Board's April 11, 2002 decisions upon the grounds they were 
untimely filed. 
3. Course of Proceedings 
ATK filed timely filed its Petition for Writ of Review of the Tax Commission 
Amended Order in the Utah Supreme Court, which transferred the case to the Utah Court 
of Appeals. The primary basis for ATK's petition seeking a reversal of the Tax 
Commission's Amended Order is that the Board did not provide ATK with proper and 
S 
legal notice of its April 11, 2001 decisions in conformity with statutory and constitutional 
law. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
The following material facts are undisputed. 
1. ATK timely protested the Salt Lake County Assessor's 2001 assessment of 
the parcels listed on Addendum B. The Board processed ATK's appeals in the regular 
course of business. 
2. ATK is the taxpayer on all parcels listed in Addendum B, meaning it is the 
entity that paid the ad valorem property tax or privilege tax levied on the assessed value 
of each listed parcel. ATK received assessment notices on all such parcels, but it did not 
receive, neither did the Board send to ATK, notice of the Board's April 11, 2001 
decisions on ATK's protests of each such assessment. 
3. On December 20, 2001, ATK appeared through its counsel and presented 
evidence and argument to the Board with respect to ATK's protest of the 2001 assessed 
values of those parcels listed in Addendum B. 
4. The Board's "General Instructions" to "property owners" appearing before 
the Board (copy attached as Addendum C) require the taxpayer to identify the name, 
address and telephone number of its "Additional Agent or Representative." As plainly 
visible on Addendum C, the undersigned counsel for ATK is identified as the taxpayer's 
designated, Board-required agent. The same form as shown on Addendum C applies to 
all parcels. 
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5. On April 11, 2002, the Board issued a decision on each of the parcels listed 
in Addendum B whose assessed values ATK had protested. 
6. The Board sent some notices of its April 11, 2002 decisions on some 
parcels, specifically those in which "Alliant" is shown as the "owner" on Addendum B to 
"Alliant Techsystems, Inc. c/o Tax Dept. MN01-3090, 5050 Lincoln Dr., Edina MN." 
The Board did not and never has sent notices of its decisions on such parcels to counsel 
for ATK, who was the designated, Board-required agent for ATK, nor to the individual at 
ATK who filed the initial protests of the assessed values. 
7. The Board sent some notices of its April 11, 2002 decisions on some 
parcels, specifically those in which the "USA" is shown as the "owner" on Addendum B 
to ATK's corporate headquarters, rather than the United States Navy, the legal owner of 
such parcels. The Board did not and never has sent notices of its decisions on such 
parcels to the United States Navy, nor to counsel for ATK, who was the designated, 
Board-required agent for ATK, nor to the individual at ATK who filed the initial protests 
of the assessed values. 
8. The Board sent notice of its April 11, 2002 decision on one parcel, 
specifically the parcel for which "Kennecott" is shown as the "owner" on Addendum B to 
Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation. The Board did not and has never sent notice of its 
decision on such parcel to ATK, nor to counsel for ATK, who was the designated, Board-
required agent for ATK, nor to the individual at ATK who filed the initial protest of the 
assessed value. Kennecott has never sent notice of the Board's April 11, 2002 decision to 
ATK. 
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9. The Board sent some notices of its April 11, 2002 decisions on some 
parcels, specifically those for which "Pension/Profit Plan Nuteam" is shown as the 
"owner" in Addendum B to "Nuteam." The Board did not and never has sent notices of 
its decisions on such parcels to ATK, nor to counsel for ATK, who was the designated, 
Board-required agent for ATK, nor to the individual at ATK who filed the initial protests. 
Nuteam has never sent notice of the Board's April 11, 2002 decision to ATK. 
10. For all of the parcels listed on Addendum B, ATK is the "taxpayer," 
meaning that it is the entity that paid property taxes on the assessed value of all listed 
parcels. For six of the parcels shown in Addendum B, the United States Navy is the 
"owner," although ATK is the taxpayer who initially paid the taxes levied upon the 
assessed value of such parcels, and who subsequently sought reimbursement on amounts 
paid from the United States. The United States Navy has never submitted any document 
to the Board designating ATK as its agent for receipt of notices on property tax protests 
involving government-owned property. 
11. The Board never sent ATK notice of its decisions on ATK's protest of the 
2001 assessed value of those parcels for which "USA" or "Nuteam" is the "owner." The 
Board never sent Notice to ATK's counsel, as the designated, Board-required agent for 
ATK, on any parcel. 
12. On July 16, 2002, ATK's counsel and designated, Board-required agent 
discovered on his own initiative that the Board had issued its decisions with respect to the 
parcels listed on Addendum B on April 11, 2002. Prior to that date, ATK's Board-
required agent had no knowledge that the Board had issued its April 11, 2002 decisions. 
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13. On July 24, 2002, ATK filed notices of appeal of the Board's final 
decisions, dated April 11, 2002, on ATK's protests of the 2001 assessments of real 
property and improvements in Salt Lake County that ATK either owns, leases or operates 
at the direction and control of the United States Navy. These Notices of Appeal were 
accompanied with a cover letter from Maxwell A. Miller, counsel and designated agent 
and representative for ATK, to Craig Sorensen, the Salt Lake County Auditor (copy 
attached as Addendum D). ATK's cover letter acknowledged that the statutorily 
prescribed period for an appeal is "within 30 days after the final action by the county 
board" or by May 13, 2002, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1006(1), and that ATK 
did not file an appeal to the Tax Commission by such date. 
14. However, ATK's cover letter suggested that the statutorily prescribed 
period is subordinate to binding constitutional "due process," which Amendment XIV of 
the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
guarantee, respectively, to citizens of the United States and Utah. ATK's cover letter 
further explained that, under the circumstances, the Board failed to provide ATK with 
constitutionally required "adequate notice" and a "meaningful opportunity" to appeal the 
Board's decisions for reasons specified in the letter. 
15. The Board, its staff and its counsel had actual knowledge that ATK's 
counsel was the designated, Board-required agent for ATK in the 2001 proceeding. By 
and through the attorneys captioned in the heading of this brief, ATK had previously 
protested the Salt Lake County Assessor's assessment of the same property for 1995, 
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2002 before the Board and the Tax Commission. 
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ATK's protests of its assessments for 1995-1999 are pending before the Third District 
Court for the State of Utah.' ATK's protest of its 2000 assessment is pending before the 
Tax Commission. 2 ATK's protest of its 2002 assessment is pending before the Tax 
Commission but has not yet been assigned an appeal number. 
16. By Amended Order dated October 28, 2002, the Tax Commission granted 
the Board's Motion to Dismiss ATK's appeal of the Board's April 11, 2002 decisions 
upon the grounds that ATK had not timely filed an appeal of the Board's Decision within 
thirty days. 
1
 The Clerk of the Third Judicial District initially assigned the parties' various 
appeals of the Tax Commission's final decisions for 1995-1996 respectively to Judges 
Nehring (990912695), Hanson (00090065 AA), Lewis (00901301), Medley (000901449 
AA), and Memmott (00070001). With agreement from all parties, the 1995-1996 
"valuation cases" were consolidated and reassigned to the Honorable Lynn W. Davis (a 
District Judge for the Fourth District) sitting as a "Tax Court Judge" for an "Independent 
Action" ATK filed against Salt Lake County. Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
County Board of Equalization, et al., 3rd Dist. Civil No. 990912695. ATK appealed the 
Tax Commission's final decision for 1997-1999. The case was assigned 3rd Dist. Civil 
No. 01090830, and eventually reassigned to the Honorable Lynn W. Davis. 
2 Alliant Techsystems v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization, Appeal No. 01-
0974. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
Utah Code §59-2-1001(4) requires the Board to notify the "taxpayer" of its 
decisions. The Board violated this statute by failing to notify ATK and its designated 
agent, the "taxpayer," of the Board's decisions. 
The Tax Commission's read of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4), limiting its 
application to "owners," is a non sequitur. The Tax Commission erroneously held the 
word "taxpayer" in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) must mean "owner," and nothing but 
"owner," though Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1001(4) does not say that. The Tax 
Commission wrongly assumes the prerogative to rewrite Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) 
and substitute "owner" for "taxpayer," when many owners, as in this case, do not pay 
and have never paid taxes on leased property. 
The Tax Commission's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) is 
inconsistent with other binding property tax statutes. The Tax Commission's implicit, but 
unwarranted assumption - that assessment statutes necessarily carry the same meaning of 
the word "taxpayer" as Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) - is likewise incorrect. The 
entity entitled to a refund under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321 is not necessarily the 
owner, which may have no knowledge that its lessee paid taxes levied on the assessed 
value of the owner's property. It logically follows, therefore, that those statutes 
providing for refunds to those who have erroneously paid taxes are "taxpayers," and the 
same entities within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) that should receive 
notice of Board decisions affecting them. 
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The Tax Commission's conclusion that the word "taxpayer" in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-2-1004(4) is limited to "owner" also contradicts other statutes in Part 10 of the 
Property Tax Act. Had the Tax Commission properly applied rules of statutory 
construction it would have concluded that "taxpayer" and "owner" may be overlapping 
but are not necessarily mutually exclusive categories, as the Tax Commission 
presupposes. Notice to the "owner" is not necessarily notice to the "taxpayer," as is 
statutorily required. 
II. 
Multiple binding precedents of the United States Supreme Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court establish the constitutional rule that individuals, including corporations, 
must receive "actual notice" and a "meaningful opportunity to be heard" before the 
government deprives them of their property. These cases hold that the practical inquiry 
must be who, in fact, should receive actual notice, especially when the government 
knows the identity of persons requesting notice, as the Board did here. Since 1995, the 
same firm and the same attorneys have represented ATK in multiple proceedings. 
Furthermore, the same firm has repeatedly and explicitly identified itself as the agent on 
the Board's form requiring the designation of an agent. The cases also hold that "due 
process" requires the government to give the best possible notice under the 
circumstances. Accordingly, the Board cannot simply disregard reality and not provide 
actual notice to ATK and its explicitly designated agent without violating ATK's 
constitutional right to due process of law. The Board violated ATK's state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process of law because the notices sent of its April 11, 2002 
12 
decisions did not provide "actual notice" to ATK and its designated agent, and did not 
provide ATK a meaningful opportunity to be heard 
III. 
The Board claimed that its own rule providing notice to the "owner of record" is 
synonymous with "taxpayer" in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4). This argument begs the 
question simply by assuming the rule's consistency with the statute. The argument is 
frivolous because rules at odds with governing statutes are void. The Board violated its 
own rules by failing to notify the United States Navy, as the "owner" of five parcels 
shown in Addendum B, and upon whose assessed values ATK paid a "privilege tax," of 
the Board's April 11, 2002 decisions on ATK's protest of the assessed value of such 
parcels. Moreover, the Board's rule of providing notice to the "owner of record" is void 
as applied here because it conflicts with Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4), which requires 
notice to a "taxpayer." The Board's rule is likewise void because it conflicts with state 
and federal constitutional due process mandates. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO NOTIFY ATK OF ITS DECISIONS 
REGARDING ATK'S PROTEST OF THE ASSESSED VALUES OF THE 
PARCELS LISTED IN ADDENDUM "B" VIOLATES A STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENT THAT THE BOARD SO NOTIFY THE AFFECTED 
"TAXPAYER." 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) provides in pertinent part, "The clerk of the board 
of equalization shall notify the taxpayer, in writing, of any decision of the board." That 
never happened, making the Board's notices, such as they were, statutorily defective. 
Instead, for some parcels, the Board notified ATK, the nondescript corporate entity, of its 
April 11, 2001 decisions, rather than the individual at ATK who filed ATK's protests of 
the assessed values, or ATK's designated agent. The Board never notified ATK, in any 
capacity, of its decisions on other parcels, whose assessed values carried over $100 
million, and upon which ATK is the taxpayer that paid taxes and filed protests. The 
Board never notified ATK's designated, Board-required agent of its decision on any 
parcels. No reasonable person would or could conclude that under such circumstances 
the Board notified the "taxpayer," as it was statutorily required to do. 
Before the Tax Commission, the Board claimed the "clerk" had indeed notified the 
"taxpayers of record." Bd. Mem. at 8. But that is simply not true under any party's 
definition of the term. If one redefines "taxpayer," as does the Tax Commission, to mean 
"owner" (and not the entity that pays taxes), the Board's claim is partly true, to the extent 
it notified ATK, the corporate entity of some decisions. Yet the Board never notified the 
United States Navy of its decisions as to those government-owned parcels. Instead, the 
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Board inexplicably notified ATK as to its decisions on government-owned parcels. How 
is one to make sense of such an inconsistent hodge-podge? 
To the Board and the Tax Commission, the word "taxpayer" in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-2-1001(4) necessarily carries an idiosyncratic, albeit standardless and selective 
meaning. According to the Tax Commission, "taxpayer" usually means "owner," thereby 
excluding ATK from entitlement to notice of the Board's decisions for many parcels 
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4). Am. Order at 3. But sometimes, the Tax 
Commission informs us, "taxpayer" could mean "taxpayer," depending, evidently, upon 
whether the "owner" appoints an agent. Id. The Tax Commission claims, "Presumably, 
a property owner can appoint an agent to receive tax notices and other property tax 
notices by notifying the County Recorder." Id. at 4. This gratuitous comment is 
disconcerting because ATK took all reasonable steps in accordance with the Board's 
instructions to appoint an agent. The Board's "General Instructions" to "property 
owners" appearing before the Board require the taxpayer to identify the name, address 
and telephone number of its "Additional Agent or Representative." As plainly visible on 
Addendum D, counsel for ATK is identified as the taxpayer's designated, Board-required 
agent. 
Notwithstanding compliance with the Board's instructions, the Board claims 
ATK's designated, Board-required agent is not entitled to notice of the Board's decisions. 
According to the Board and the Tax Commission, ATK would have had to expressly 
notify the County Recorder in order for its agent to receive notices of the Board's 
decisions. Yet there are no instructions or information suggesting to a taxpayer that an 
1 C 
additional request for notice, beyond completion of the Board-required form, is necessary 
for a designated agent to receive notice of the Board's decisions. 
Notice to the County Recorder is neither a legal nor standard prerequisite to 
creation of an agency relationship. Well-established agency law is, instead, that the 
principal, in this instance ATK, creates the agency relationship by manifesting its consent 
that the agent, in this case ATK's counsel, has authority to act for it. See, e.g., Am. Jur. 
2d Agency § 70 (2000)(" Actual authority is such as the principal intentionally confers 
upon the agent[.]"). City Elec. v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 
1983) ("It is the principal who must cause third parties to believe that the agent is clothed 
with apparent authority.,f) Third parties have an affirmative duty to ascertain the 
authority of the agent, who binds the principal and stands in its shoes. See, e.g., Am. Jur. 
2d Agency § 84 (2000) ("[A] person who deals with an agent with notice that the 
authority is in fact defined in writing is bound to know the extent of the agents' authority 
. . ."). In this case, the Board was expressly and repeatedly notified that ATK's counsel 
was its agent. 
Yet the Board was either unaware of or simply ignored established agency law in 
failing to notify ATK's counsel of its decisions. The Board also ignored its own 
requirements that ATK designate an agent. Of what utility is this requirement if the 
Board, though obligated to process ATK's appeals, is nonetheless free to ignore the 
taxpayer's designated, Board-required agent? Obviously, none. Yet, inexplicably, the 
Tax Commission concludes ATK's designation of counsel as its agent on Addendum C is 
legally insufficient to appoint ATK's counsel as its agent for receipt of notices. 
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Rather, the Tax Commission concludes ATK could have "identified the County 
Recorder." There is no analysis or case law cited for imposing that undisclosed 
prerequisite on ATK's right to receive notice of the County's decisions. Yet, again 
inconsistently, the Board accepted and processed ATK's protests on the assessed value of 
all parcels, even though it was not an "owner" of certain parcels. In short, the Tax 
Commission's Decision offers no standards by which someone aggrieved by the Board's 
decisions can determine when the "owner" or "taxpayer" has successfully appointed an 
agent and when it has not. 
Kennecott and Nuteam Pension and Profit Sharing Plan are the "owners" of 
certain parcels to whom the Board mailed several notices of its decisions. The Tax 
Commission apparently deemed these entities to be "taxpayers" within the meaning of 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4), though neither entity paid taxes on the parcels ATK 
possesses under a long-term lease. To confuse matters even more, the Board sent notices 
of its decisions on parcels the United States owns, but ATK operates under the 
supervision and control of the United States Navy, to the nondescript ATK corporate 
entity, rather than the individual at ATK who filed the appeal protests, and of whom the 
Board had actual knowledge. 
Is this convoluted process in harmony with statutory requirements? The Tax 
Commission apparently thinks so, yet its analysis of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) to 
justify denying ATK a hearing on its appeal of the Board's decisions is (1) a non-
sequitur; (2) internally inconsistent with other statutes in Part 10 of the Property Tax Act, 
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entitled "Equalization;" and (3) oblivious to or in violation of case law interpreting taxing 
statutes broadly in favor of the taxpayer. 
First, the Tax Commission's read of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4), limiting its 
application to "owners" is a non sequitur. The Tax Commission apparently believes the 
word "taxpayer" in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) must mean "owner," and nothing but 
"owner," though Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) does not say what the Tax Commission 
claims it says. Neither does the Tax Commission explain how the Board can possibly 
satisfy Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) when it never notified the United States, as 
"owner," of the Board's decisions. Ignoring that logical incoherency, the Tax 
Commission assumes the prerogative to rewrite Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) and 
substitute "owner" for "taxpayer," when many owners, as in this case, do not pay and 
have never paid taxes on leased property. Such "taxpayers," like ATK, are nonetheless 
the undisputed party that has historically paid the disputed tax, appealed disputed 
assessments, and the party that should receive statutory notice of all the Board's 
decisions. The Tax Commission's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) to 
the contrary thus violates a salient rule of statutory construction, that statutory words 
should be interpreted according to their plain and ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Morton 
Infl, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Cornm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 590 (Utah) (Each term "should be 
interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary 
meaning of the term results in an application that is neither unreasonably confused, 
inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.'1) 
18 
The Utah appellate courts concur in the general meaning of "taxpayer" as one who 
pays taxes. Reported Utah appellate decisions have interpreted the word "taxpayer" to 
mean just what it says. From a CD search of Utah cases, the Utah appellate courts have 
used the word "taxpayer" approximately 881 times.3 The obvious meaning of the word 
in all cases ATK has reviewed is that taxpayer means the person paying a legally 
assessed tax. A narrowed search to cases including the terms "property," "taxes" and 
"taxpayer" yields 106 hits. Yet again, these cases simply take it for granted that 
"taxpayer" in a property tax context means the entity paying taxes, though the "taxpayer" 
may also have been the "owner." 
Application of the applicable rule of statutory construction and case law in this 
case means that "taxpayer" should be understood to mean "taxpayer" or "one that pays or 
is liable for tax," not necessarily the "owner." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 
"taxpayer" (1980 ed.). Accordingly, the "taxpayer," or in this instance ATK and its 
designated agent, should have received actual statutory notice of all the Board's decisions 
on ATK's property tax assessment protests. 
The Tax Commission's view of the law, denying "taxpayers" of notice, is, 
moreover, a non sequitur because it unavoidably triggers constitutional issues, such as: 
whether notice to non-taxpayer owners is constitutionally defective because those most 
affected by government action, the "taxpayers," would have their property confiscated 
without a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The Tax Commission's interpretation of 
section 59-2-1004(4)(that "taxpayer" must mean "owner") thus violates yet another well-
3
 Law on Disc for Utah, LEXIS (Utah appellate decisions through June 2002). 
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established rule of statutory construction, that statutes should be interpreted so as to avoid 
constitutional problems. See, e.g., West v. Thomson, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994) 
(statutes should be construed if possible to avoid constitutional issues). The Tax 
Commission's decision appears unconscious of this rule because its analysis is devoid of 
any constitutional considerations. 
Second, the Tax Commission's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) 
is inconsistent with other binding property tax statutes. In support of its rewrite of 
section 59-2-1001(4), the Tax Commission cites a laundry list of other property tax 
statutes to the effect that property is assessed to the owner. That is generally, but not 
always, true. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1325 renders the distinction between "owners" and 
"leaseholders" potentially meaningless. It provides, "A tax upon real property is a lien 
against the property assessed. A tax due upon improvements upon real property assessed 
to a person other than the owner of the real property is a lien upon the property and 
improvements. These liens attach as of January 1 of each year." Given this statutory 
language, the Utah Supreme Court held that taxes could be collected either from the 
leaseholder and party in possession or, failing that, the property owner. Said the Court, 
"It is obvious from the plain language of this section [59-2-1325] that the legislature 
contemplated that a tax on improvements might be assessed to someone other than the 
owner of the underlying property." Crossroads Plaza Ass 'n v. Pratt, 912 P.2d 961, 965 
(Utah 1996). (emphasis added). If one takes the Crossroads holding seriously, the Tax 
Commission's assertion that all references to "taxpayers" in the Property Tax Act must 
be limited to owners is plainly wrong. 
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The Tax Commission's implicit, but unwarranted assumption - that assessment 
statutes necessarily carry the same meaning of the word "taxpayer" as Utah Code Ann. § 
59-2-1001(4) - is likewise overly simplistic. The assumption makes no sense. For 
instance, if property is erroneously or unlawfully assessed, the entity that paid the taxes 
should receive a refund under Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321 (providing a 
refund remedy for erroneously or illegally collected taxes). The entity entitled to a 
refund under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321 is not necessarily the owner, which may have 
no knowledge that its lessee paid taxes levied on the assessed value of the owner's 
property. No reasonable person would contend that refunds should be given to someone 
other than the payor. It logically follows, therefore, that those statutes providing for 
refunds to those who have erroneously paid taxes are "taxpayers," and the same entities 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) that should receive notice of 
Board decisions affecting them. Otherwise, those who pay the taxes may never receive 
notice, as is the case here for many parcels ATK possesses as lessee or operates as a 
permittee. 
The Tax Commission's conclusion that the word "taxpayer" in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-2-1004(4) is limited to "owner" also contradicts other statutes in Part 10 of the 
Property Tax Act. For instance, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1004 uses both the word 
"taxpayer" and "owner." Had the Tax Commission followed another rule of statutory 
construction, that statutes should be construed in pari materia or as a comprehensive 
whole, it would have concluded that "taxpayer" and "owner" may be overlapping but are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive categories, as the Tax Commission presupposes. See, 
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e.g., Morton International, supra at 591 ("terms of a statute are to be interpreted as a 
comprehensive whole and not in a piecemeal fashion."). 
In other words, notice to the owner is not necessarily notice to the taxpayer, as is 
statutorily required. The significance of this conclusion is evident from a review of the 
statutory language. The legislature chose to use the word "dissatisfied taxpayer" in Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-1004(l)(a) to identify entities that could appeal a valuation, and the 
word "taxpayer" in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1004(2)(a) to describe those who could 
"make an application to appeal the valuation or equalization of the taxpayer's real 
property." The Tax Commission and the Board have unqualifiedly, consistently and 
uniformly interpreted the word "taxpayer" in this instance to mean the entity that pays 
taxes. Hence, ATK has, at least since 1995 protested the assessment of its property, as 
well as property it leases from Kennecott, Nuteam, and property it operates under the 
direction and control of the United States Navy. No one, including the Tax Commission 
and the Board, has ever challenged ATK's rights to file such appeals - presumably 
because the Tax Commission, the Board, and opposing counsel all viewed ATK as "the 
taxpayer," within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1004(2)(a). 
In fact, the Tax Commission has issued "final decisions" with respect to the 1995, 
1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999 assessments based upon the heretofore implicit assumption 
that ATK was the "taxpayer," statutorily entitled to appeal the assessments on parcels it 
possess or operates, even though it is not the "owner " of many such parcels. Likewise, 
the Tax Court has now approved a Settlement Agreement between ATK and the County 
Board for 1995 to 1999 inclusive, based upon the same implicit assumption. The 
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District Court has approved a settlement of the 1995-1999 tax assessments, even though 
the Tax Commission's "final decisions" included valuations on parcels ATK did not and 
does not own. See Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization, 3rd 
Dist. Civil No. 990912695 (Memorandum Decisions, June 7, 2002; December 10, 2002). 
In Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1004(3), the legislature chose to use the word "owner," 
to describe the applicant's obligation to "include" its estimate of fair market value in its 
application for appeal. ATK has always fulfilled that statutory obligation in filing 
appeals of its assessments, though it is not the "owner".of some parcels it has appealed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1004(5) switches back to use of the words "dissatisfied taxpayer" 
to identify who can take an appeal from the Board of Equalization. If "taxpayers" are not 
entitled to statutory rights pertaining to "owners," as the Tax Commission's Order holds, 
this statute becomes internally inconsistent and its application chaotic. Though ATK has 
never owned some of the parcels at issue, it has always been the "taxpayer" and hence 
entitled to appeal assessments upon which it has paid levied taxes. By paying taxes, it 
has the corresponding right to receive notices. The only logical conclusion, therefore, is 
that all "taxpayers," meaning those entities which pay taxes, are "owners" for purposes of 
Part 10, although not all "owners," meaning those having title to property, are 
"taxpayers" if they have paid no taxes. 
Third, the Tax Commission's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4) 
patently violates another well-established rule, that taxing statutes, to the extent of any 
ambiguity, must be construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing 
authority. An example of this rule's application is Hercules Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n , 
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21 P.3d 231 (Utah App. 2000), where this Court reversed the Tax Commission because it 
refused to honor the rule. Hercules was a sales tax case in which the taxpayer argued that 
statutes imposing taxes, as distinguished from exemption statutes that make exceptions to 
otherwise taxable transactions, must be construed in the "taxpayer's" favor. In agreeing 
with Hercules, this Court explained the basic concepts: 
Finally, and most important to our analysis, is our rule in 
taxation cases that "if any doubt exists as to the meaning of 
the statute, 'our practice is to construe taxation statutes 
liberally in favor of the taxpayer, leaving it to the legislature 
to clarify an intent to be more restrictive if such intent 
exists.11' Wasatch County Bd. of Equalization v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 944 P.2d 370, 374 (Utah 1997) (quoting Salt Lake 
County v. State Tax Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 
1989)). 
M a t 233. 
Property in Utah is, by constitutional mandate, subject to taxation. Utah Const, 
art. XIII, sec. 2. That means Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4), which sets up the 
procedure for appealing property tax assessments, is a "taxing statute." Its provisions 
should, therefore, be construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer, and strictly against the 
taxing authority, to avoid imposition of taxes, or confiscation of property, by implication. 
The Board's failure to notify ATK, and its designated agent, of its decisions on all parcels 
whose assessments ATK protested violated Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(4). This Court 
should reverse the Tax Commission's Amended Order to the contrary. 
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B. THE BOARD FAILED TO PROVIDE ATK WITH "ADEQUATE" 
NOTICE, AND A "MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD" AS 
REQUIRED BY FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "no person shall . . . be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Multiple binding precedents of the 
United States Supreme Court establish the general rule that individuals, including 
corporations, must receive "actual notice" and a "meaningful opportunity to be heard" 
before the government deprives them of their property. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Tulsa Professional Collection 
Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 000 (1988); Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 
462 U.S. 791(1983). 
For instance, in Mullane, the Court invalidated a New York law that permitted 
banks to give its periodic reports to investors by publishing those reports in the 
newspaper. Notwithstanding strict compliance with New York law, the likelihood that 
any given investor would actually "receive" such reports by reading them in the 
newspaper was slight. The Court explained, "when notice is a person's due, process 
which is a mere gesture is not due process." Id. at 315. The statutory notice at issue in 
Mullane was held to be inadequate "not because in fact it fails to reach everyone, but 
because under the circumstances it is not reasonably calculated to reach those who could 
easily be informed by other means at hand." Id. at 319. Accordingly, the Court held that 
"notice of judicial settlement of accounts [required by New York law] is incompatible 
with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for adjudication depriving 
known persons whose whereabouts are also known of substantial property rights." Id. at 
320. 
Tulsa follows a similar rationale in reversing the Oklahoma Supreme Court's 
approval of a state process that denied actual notice and a meaningful opportunity to the 
creditor of an estate, despite expiration of the statutory filing period. Under the 
Oklahoma Probate Code, creditors' claims against an estate are generally barred 
"forever," unless presented to the executor within two months after publication of probate 
proceedings. The Court explained at length that compliance with statutory notice 
procedures was not dispositive for due process analysis. "As a class, creditors may not 
be aware of a debtor's death or of the institution of probate proceedings. Moreover, the 
executor or executrix will often be, as is the case here, a party with a beneficial interest in 
the estate. This could diminish an executor's or executrix's inclination to call attention to 
the potential expiration of a creditor's claims. There is thus a substantial practical need 
for actual notice in this setting." Id. at 489. In other words, a primary reason the Court 
held that the notice provisions of Oklahoma law violated due process is that the executor 
had every incentive to deny the creditors "actual notice" of the probate proceeding. 
Mennonite involves the sale of real property for delinquent taxes. State law 
provided for tax sales in certain circumstances and for a two-year redemption period 
following sale, during which the owner or lienholder could redeem the property. The 
On July 16, 2002, when ATK's counsel discovered for the first time that the Board had 
issued its decisions on April 11, 2002, he was also informed that County personnel 
rejoiced because ATK's appeal rights had presumably expired. Mem. in Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss, n. 2. 
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owner in Mennonite received actual notice of the sale, but the mortgagee had been given 
notice only by publication. Again, the Court invalidated the state notice statute as applied 
to the mortgagee, holding that "actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to 
a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interest of any party, 
whether unlettered or well versed in commercial practice, if its name and address are 
reasonably ascertainable." Id. at 800. 
As in the cases cited above, the practical inquiry here must be who, in fact, should 
receive actual notice, especially when the government knows the identity of persons 
requesting notice, as the Board did here. Since 1995 ATK has litigated its property tax 
assessments the Salt Lake County Assessor has issued. The same firm and the same 
attorneys have represented ATK in all those proceedings, and the firm has explicitly 
identified itself as the agent on the Board's form requiring the disclosure and designation 
of an agent, on pleadings and memoranda the firm submitted to the Board, and in 
appearance before the Board. Given those undisputed facts, the Board cannot simply 
disregard reality and not provide actual notice to ATK and its explicitly designated agent 
without violating ATK's constitutional right to due process of law. 
Put another way, the Board cannot lawfully excuse itself from providing "adequate 
notice" and a "meaningful opportunity" to be heard, by espousing blind adherence to rote 
rules that are so fundamentally unfair, as applied in this case, they run afoul of 
constitutionally guaranteed due process. Governments have an overarching and 
undergirding constitutional responsibility to deal honestly and fairly with their citizens. 
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The honest and fair standard under the United States Constitution, as the United 
States Supreme Court has held, requires the best notice that is reasonably possible under 
the circumstances. Due process, in other words, is not an optional luxury the Board may 
indulge upon demand.5 Here, the best notice that is reasonable under the circumstances 
would be notice to ATK's designated, Board-required agent, notwithstanding the Board's 
apparent practice of ignoring the Board-required agents and sending notices of its 
decisions to disinterested, non-taxpayers, simply because they are "owners." 
The Utah Supreme Court's due process requirements are identical to those the 
United States Supreme Court has enunciated. Said the Utah Supreme Court, "due 
process is flexible and, being based on the concept of fairness, should afford the 
procedural protections that the given situation demands." In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 
876 (Utah 1996) (quotations omitted); see also Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 
341 (Utah 1980). The minimum requirements are adequate notice and an opportunity to 
be heard in a meaningful manner. See V-1 Oil Co. v. Dep't. of Envtl Quality, 939 P.2d 
1191,1197 (Utah 1997); In re Worthen, 926 P.2d at 876; Lindon City v. Engineers 
Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1075 (Utah 1981). 
The Affidavit of Mike Reed at the Tax Commission level claims, "Had Allliant or its 
agent requested that the Clerk of the Board send a notice of its decisions to Alliant's 
agent, the Clerk of the Board would have done so to the extent such action complies with 
statute and the Board's Administrative Rules for the relevant tax years." Aff. of Mike 
Read, \ 6. To the Board, designation of an agent is not enough for the agent to receive 
notice or trigger constitutional obligations to send notice. Even designation of an agent, 
and a specific request for notice is not enough, if the Clerk of the Board deems a request 
for notice in conflict with the Board's undisclosed rules. 
28 
In re Worthen is a case in point. The due process issue in Worthen was whether 
the Judicial Conduct Commission had provided adequate notice of disciplinary action to 
Justice Court judges accused of misconduct. In its analysis of due process, the Court first 
stressed that adequate notice is a fundamental right. "Judges [and Aerospace companies] 
are entitled to the same basic due process protections afforded to these other 
professionals [or taxpayers] because these protections are, indeed, fundamental rights 
which inure to the benefit of every citizen of this state." Id. at 877. The Judicial Conduct 
Commission rule provided "the notice shall specify in ordinary and concise language the 
charges against the judge." This rule is adequate on its face, but the Court found the 
Judicial Conduct Commission had not properly implemented its own rules: 
The most troubling aspect of the deficiencies we have 
identified in the cases before us is the lack of specificity in 
the formal notice and at the hearings regarding the governing 
legal and ethical standards and the rules or laws the judges 
allegedly violated. We are firmly convinced that if we are 
unable to discern the specific nature of the Commission's 
charges after it has rendered its order, the judges in these 
cases received insufficient notice of the charges against them 
before their hearings. 
Id. at 877-878. 
If notice to accused judges is constitutionally defective because it is not actual 
notice of specific charges, despite compliance with notice rules, a fortiori general notice 
of the Board's decision, in this case, to disinterested owners is constitutionally defective 
as to ATK, the interested taxpayer. The Board violated ATK's state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process of law because the notices sent of its April 11, 2002 
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decisions did not provide "actual notice" to ATK and its designated agent, and did not 
provide ATK a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 
C THE BOARD VIOLATED ITS OWN RULES BY FAILING TO NOTIFY 
THE UNITED STATES NAVY, AS THE "OWNER" OF FIVE PARCELS 
SHOWN IN ADDENDUM B, AND UPON WHOSE ASSESSED VALUES 
ATK PAID A "PRIVILEGE TAX," OF THE BOARD'S APRIL 11, 2002 
DECISIONS ON ATK'S PROTEST OF THE ASSESSED VALUE OF SUCH 
PARCELS. 
Despite the above arguments, the Board has nonetheless claimed its own rule 
providing notice to the "owner of record" is synonymous with "taxpayer" in Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-2-1001(4), so that notice to an owner is all that is required of it. Mem. in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss at 10. This argument begs the question simply by 
assuming the rule's consistency with the statute when that is the precise issue to be 
decided. The argument is frivolous because rules at odds with governing statutes are 
void. See, e.g., Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div., 846 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1993)("It 
is a longstanding principle of administrative law that an agency's rules must be consistent 
with its governing statutes."). The Board violated its own rules by failing to notify the 
United States Navy, as the "owner" of five parcels shown in Addendum B, and upon 
whose assessed values ATK paid a "privilege tax," of the Board's April 11, 2002 
decisions on ATK's protest of the assessed value of such parcels. Moreover, the Board's 
rule of providing notice to the "owner of record" is void as applied here because it 
conflicts with Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1004(1), which requires notice to a "taxpayer." 
The Board's rule is likewise void because it conflicts with state and federal constitutional 
due process mandates as explained above. The Board should have followed the statute, 
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have followed the statute, and not its own inconsistent procedures, and provided actual, 
written notice of its April 11, 2001 decisions on all parcels to ATK and its designated, 
Board-required agent as the "taxpayer" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
1001(4). 
CONCLUSION 
The Board's notice of its April 11, 2002 decisions are statutorily and 
constitutionally defective. For that reason, the Tax Commission's Amended Order 
granting the Board's Motion to Dismiss should be reversed, and ATK should be afforded 
the "meaningful opportunity" to pursue its appeal of the Board's decisions a formal 
hearing before the Tax Commission. 
DATED this A* day of February, 2003. ^ 
MAXWELL A. MILLER 
RANDY M. GRIMSHAW 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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Order Grant ing Motion to Dismiss 





Petitioner filed an appeal of decisions issued by the Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization pertaining to thirty-two parcels of land owned, leased or otherwise occupied by 
Petitioner. Ailiant Techsystems. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Petitioner 
failed to file its appeal of those decisions within 30 days of the Board's final action. Both parties 
filed briefs in support of their positions on the Motion. After reviewing the parties' claims and 
arguments, as set out in their briefs, the Commission issues this decision on the Motion. 
Under section 59-2-1006 of the Utah Code, a party who is dissatisfied with a decision of 
the County Board of Equalization may appeal that decision to the Tax Commission by filing notice 
of the appeal with Ihe County Auditor within 30 days after the final action of (he Board. The Board 
of Equalization issued its decisions in April and mailed notice of the decisions pertaining to 29 of 
the parcels on April I f 2002 and the decisions pertaining to the other two parcels on April 25, 
2002/ There is no genuine dispute as to the fact that Respondent mailed notices of its decisions to 
the property owners of record, except that the notices issued on parcels owned by Ihe federal 
government were mailed to Petitioner." Nor is there a dispute as to whether those notices were 
received by the property owners. No notice was mailed to Petitioner7s legal counsel. Petitioner's 
legal counsel eventually discovered that the decisions had been issued and filed appeals from those 
decision on July 24. 2002, more than 30 days after the Board's final action. 
Order is amended to correct the parcel list to account for 32 parcels under appeal 
The appeals of 32 parcels of property were apparently consolidated by the Board and heard 
together (R Reply Memo
 : P. 3). There is no indication why notices of the decisions pertaining to two 
parcels were mailed two weeks after the other notices were mailed, but that information is not essentia! to 
our decision here 
Property owned by the federal government is. of course, exempt from property tax. but 
Petitioner's beneficial use of federal property is subject to a privilege tax under section >9--M0J of the 
Utah Code Therefore, because. Petitioner is legally liable for the privilege tax. notices of the decisions on 
the k-deiallv owned parcels were mailed to Petitioner. 
Appeal No 0? ]<H5 
Pa^e 2 of ^  
Respondent s Motion to Dismiss raises a jurisdictional issue Respondent argues that when 
a partx fails to file an appeal within the statutor) time period, the Tax Commission has no 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal Petitioner disagrees However Petitioner points to no specific 
statutor\ authority granting the Commission authorit} to hear late-filed appeals or to expand the 30 
day appeal period prescribed by law Instead, Petitioner relies on a due process argument stating, in 
essence tint the Board s failure to timel> notif\ Petitioner's legal counsel of its decisions violated 
Petitioner s rights of due process Petitioner further argues that the Tax Commission has a duty to 
remedy Respondent s breech of Petitioner s due process rights b\ using its discretion under Utah 
Code section 59 ) 210 (8) to reconvene the Board of Equalization for the purpose of ordering the 
Board to reissue or remail its decisions thereby triggering a new 30<lay appeal period 
The Tax Commission uses its discretion under section 59 2 210(8) sparingly The 
Commission will reopen a Board of Fquahzation and order it to hear an appeal onh when it finds 
that an appeal was dismissed without hearing in error We do not believe the Commission has 
authontv to require the Board once it has heard an appeal and properlv issued its decision to 
reissue the decision solely for the purpose of reselling the appeal clock fo do so would place at 
the Commission s drposal a discretionary and unassailable procedural trick that would allow the 
Commission to o\erndc the specific statutorx appeal period set out in section 592 1006 and to 
expand its own junsdictional reach to hear appeals that are otherwise barred bx passage of tune 
Section ^9 ! 210 (8) aside Petitioner argues that the fundamentals of due process require 
the Commission to intervene in this matter Of course the Board has a statutory dut\ to provide 
notice of its decisions and we reserve our right to re\ lew any situation m which it fails to do so but 
that is not this ^ase For reasons set out in this opinion we find that the notices issued b\ 
Respondent were sufficient to afford Petitioner all reasonable opportunity to act on the Board's 
decisions within the appeal penod Its failure to do so piecludes the Commission from hearing 
Petitioner s appeals 
Respondent ai<nics that the Tax Commission cannot address due process issues under im 
circumstance^ K caus<r ih° Tax Commi sion Ins no aulhontx to decide lorrntutioml issues Respondent 
apparenth misleads ih kf il authorities it has ufpd in support of dm position Alliumjh the Commission 
cannot \ dss jud ment i n die constitution iht\ of legislate e p'o\jsjons n has a dun to consider the due 
processions hick L J tin ss^nct c f cnlmmistrame h \ is diu3 process md trie essenc " ol this aLpnc\ s 
adjudK «ti\ * unhoiii i to Misurt that u tu 'ns who rn\e disputes v itlun the r Kh of ttu ( oirur'ssion s 
IiinsdiLtjon In ^ me mm fid opp< •lumt to be heard 
Appeal No 02 H ^ 
Pnge 3 of^ 
In rex lewmg the deln ery of the notices it appears that all decisions pertaining to parcels of 
property owned by Petitioner v\ere mailed to Petitioner s corporate offices in the name of 
Petitioner s tax representative Decisions pertaining to exempt parcels for which Petitioner had a 
privilege tax obligation were also mailed to Petitioner's corporate tax representative The decisions 
pertaining to non exempt parcels owned by Kennecott and Nuteam Pension and Profit Sharing Plan 
were mailed to the property owners of record Petitioner argues that to be legally sufficient, the 
notices should have also been mailed to Petitioner's legal counsel That brings us to the issue of 
who is entitled to notice of the Boards decisions 
Under section 59 2-1001 (4) of the Utah Code, the clerk of the Board of Equalization must 
notify the taxpayer of an\ decision of the Board The "taxpayer5' is the party who is legally liable 
for the tax The person w ho is legally responsible for the tax is the property owner JSee e g Utah 
Code section 59 2 303 (1) (property tax is assessed against the owner or claimant of record or the 
person in possession on the hen date each year) Utah Code Ann ^S9-2-1302 (1) (property is listed 
on the count) tax rolls in the name of the propert\ owner) Utah Code Ann §59-2 913 (4) (tax 
notices must be mailed to the property owner) Utah Code Ann §59^2 1302 (2) (an unpaid tax is a 
hen on the owner s propertv). and §59 2 1303 (delinquent tax ma\ be satisfied b> seizure of 
personal propertv owned bv the person against whom the tax was assessed) See also Buchanan \ 
Hansen 820 P 2d 908 (Utah 1991) andDillman v foster 656 P 2d 971 (Utah 1982) (both ca^es 
affnm that the owner of record is liable for the tax property tax) The decisions concerning 
parcels owned b> Petitioner weie mailed to Petitioner and the decisions concerning the pn\ ilege 
tax that Petitioner is legally liable for were also mailed to Petitioner That action seems to fulfill the 
Board s statutory7 duty 
With regard to the parcels owned b\ Kennecott and Nuteam Pension and Profit Sharing 
Plan Petitioner argues that it pa\s the tax and it is therefore entitled to notice ol the decisions We 
disagree Petitioner ma\ ha\e a pmate contractual arrangement with Kennecott and Nuteam under 
which it has agreed to pa\ the tax but Petitioner is not the lecord titleholder of these propcities nor 
is Petitioner legalh liable for the tax^ Prc^umabh a propcrn owner can appoint an agent to 
This raises the question of \huh**r a 'e^ee can lih a rropert\ \ »\ .«ppe,d without ihe e^pi^s 
authoii/ation of the pipperP owner hmhvn ^ no rued o t \ph,c \u M ;^UC IHH 
Appeal No 0" 143^ 
Page J of "> 
receive its tax notices and other property notices bv notifying the County Recorder Otherwise the 
County is under no obligation to discover and track private contractual arrangements and it has no 
authority to ^end tax notices or appeal decisions (which are essentially amended tax notices) to any 
lessee who obligates itself for payment of the taxes In tins case the decisions were mailed to the 
propert\ owners of record as required b\ law 
Petitioner argues however that its legal counsel is plainly noted on the petition form that it 
submitted to the Board of Equalization that the County has knowledge that Petitioner s legal 
counsel participated in the Board hearing and that the same legal counsel has represented Petitioner 
in Board processes o\er many years Therefore the Board had a duty to inform Petitioner s legal 
counsel of its decisions Respondent points out that the Board s petition form specifically states 
that its decisions will be mailed to the properly owner The Board s rules allow lor mailing a 
courtesy cop> to the taxpa\er s representative if the taxpaver affirmatively requests it but 
Petitioner did not request it in this case 
The fact that Petitioner was represented b> legal counsel m this Board hearing and other 
hearings over the course of its long standing dispute with the County Assessor does not impose a 
dutv on the clerk of the Board to di\ ine the notice arrangements thai the pioperty owners made w ith 
Petitioner s legal counsel On the contrarv over the course ol its dealings \\ ith Petitioner the 
Board has consistentlv adhered to its piactice of giving notice to the pioperty owners Petitioner 
and its legal counsel are surelv well aware of this practice and Petitioner has never expiessK asked 
the County to notify its legal counsel of decisions concerning its property 
Finallv Petitioner states that its long time corporate tax representative left his emploMnent 
and his replacement who received the decisions that were mailed to Petitioner tailed to act on 
them either b\ filing a timeh appeal or by notify ing his legal counsel His failuie to act certainly 
does not impute a due process violation on the County nor does it supply a basis upon which the 
Commission can set aside the statutory appeal deadline 
Respondent s Motion to Dismiss is granted 
^ilt 1 ak- ( o'int B o i i i o f L q u h Mic" Fi !• \ 1 (D»( » 
Appeal No. 02-14: 
Pase 5 of 5 
BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION: 
The undersigned Commissioners have reviewed this matter and concur in this decision. 
DATED this ,M day of [ r'tZi^C^
 ? 2002. 
Pam Hendrickson i o ^ / \<£% R Broce Johnson 
Commission Chair § • Q P * / l f # : ^ 1 Commissioner 
Palmer DePauhs Marc B JoKrtson 
Commissioner Commissioner 
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3896 S'Sienne Dr 
7700 W 4 1 0 0 S Apxb 
7700 W 4 1 0 0 S 
3976 S Brina Ln Apx 
4043 S 7100 W 
9701 W 4601 S Apxb 
9801 W 5051 S Apro 
4552 S 6000 W Apxb 
4552 S 6000 W Apxb 
7061 W 4100 S Apxb 
4652 S 6400 W Apxb 
7909 W 4100 S 
7501 W 4 1 0 0 S 
7500 W 4475 S 
7500 W 4475 S Apxb 
8601 W 4 6 8 1 S Apxb 
9501 W 4 8 0 1 S Apro 
9100 W 4963 S 
4798 S 6400 W 
4798 S 6400 W 
7700 W 4 4 7 5 S Apxb 
7700 W 4 4 7 5 S Apxb 
6392 W 5400 S Apxb 
6355 W 5400 S 
6252 W 6 2 0 0 S Apxb 
6465 W 5700 S Apro 
6149 S Uone 11 Hwy 
6149 S Uone 11 Hwy 
6802 W 6200 S Apxb 
6152 S Uone 11 Hwy 
5407 S Uone 11 Hwy 












































































3,051.77 Pension /Profit Plan Nuteam 
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Alliant Techsys tems Inc vs Salt Lake County BOE 02-1435 
Alliant Techsys tems Inc 
Michael Bell 
201 SMain Ste.400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84] II 
Craig B. Sorensen 
Salt Lake County Auditor 
2001 South State N3300 
Salt Lake City. UT 84190 
Lee A. G a r d n e r 
Salt Lake County Assessor 
2001 South State N2300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Maxwell Miller 
201 South Main, Ste. 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 




Attorney for Petitioner 
**** CERT I F !C A HON **** 
hereby certify thai 1 mailed a copy of the foregoing document addressed io each f f the above named parlies. 
Date Siimaiure 
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TabC 
r L L • • \ O C V V >v ' * l_ f- » L- . ^ L L ^ » - \ / v L J ' L i y I I ' ' ' J 
1. GENERAL INFORMATION AND DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY 
\RCEL.NUMBER 14-33-328-013-0000 
(SEE NOTICE) 
C V N I R ! S % F RECORD: A 1 1 . a n t "Techsystems I n c . 
ROPERTY LOCATION (ADDRESS):
 A r e a k n o w n a s Bacchus Works 
1ARKET VALUE (AS SHOWN ON NOTICE) % 1 74 ,000 
2. OWNER(S) OPINION OF FAIR MARKET VALUE 
AS OF JANUARY 1 OFTHE CURRENT YEAR: 
,x
 '*••*• ' ^ ~"-* 




MASTER FILE ^ 
i DATA ENTRY: 
REQUIRED A'CJ h (wcf 
BY LAW: $ 116,545 
EQUEST T H A T T H E M A R K E T V A L U E OF T H I S P R O P E R T Y BE A D J U S T E D B A S E D U P O N T H E F O L L O W I N G : 
3. B A S I S F O R A P P E A L A N D R E Q U I R E D D O C U M E N T A T I O N 
- F A I R M A R K E T V A L U E " IS D E F I N E D AS T H E A M O U N T A T W H I C H P R O P E R T Y W O U L D C H A N G E H A N D S B E T W E E N A 
W I L L I N G B U Y E R A N D SELLER N E I T H E R B E I N G U N D E R A N Y C O M P U L S I O N ( S E C T I O N 59-2-102(12} U .C .A . ) 
Y O U M U S T P R O V I D E E V I D E N C E T H A T T H E M A R K E T V A L U E O N T H E N O T I C E E X C E E D S " F A I R M A R K E T V A L U E " 
Y O U R E V I D E N C E M U S T BE B E T T E R T H A N T H E A S S E S S O R ' S IN O R D E R T O H A V E Y O U R V A L U E R E D U C E D 
tse. 
Ay Opinion of value shown abo\e is based on one or more of the fol lowing: (The order given below does no! indicate any particular pnoniy) 
: I A. Purchase of the property within one year of January I of the current year. Att3ch copy of closing or settlement statement^ from purcha 
If an appraisal was made for the sale, \nbniminc a copy of the ful l appraisal wi l l probably strengthen your appeal. 
(Pro\ »de all details possible) 
B Professional Fee Appraisal completed within one year of January I of the current year. Attach full copy of the Appraisal 
•
Appraisal w i l l be submitted p r i o r to Board proceedings. 
C. Sales of Three (.>) or more comparable piopcincs sold as close as possible »o January I of the current year 
• D Income Approach to Value. Be prepared to vhow hou \our rents or income from the property compare to market rents. 
Minimum requirement is a Rent Roll, an income aiuJ c\pen>c statement, an operating statement, or a Profit 3nd Loss Statement 
|for the property and not the business using the property) 
I f property is owner occupied you may submit rents from 3 comparable properties 
I I E. Factual error in Assessor s data or cost approach to \ aluc Please provide ful l description of error with supporting evidence. 
You must stil l include your requested opinion of value and support this value with evidence 
C E R T I F Y T H A T A L L S T A T E M E N T S H E R E I N A N D / O R A T T A C H M E N T S A R E T R U E , C O R R E C T , A N D C O M P L E T E 
A T E D T H I S 1 7 t h D A Y O F A u g u s t ,20 01 
SIGNATURE OF OWNER OR A G E N T : 
»WNER?S D A Y T I M E TELEPHONE NUMBER: ( _%2 _ ) _ J & l = 2 7 . 6 f L - ~f 
fl4f /R.N, Berg, 
4. AGENT OR REPRESENTATIVE AUTHORIZATION 
Complete this box only i f someone other than the owner o f the property w i l l f i le evidence or appear at the Board o f Equal izat ion 
You must also complete the Agent or Representative in fo rmat ion on the reverse o f this f o rm or have it on f i le w i t h the Board. 
I f Agent or Representative is to provide a professional op in ion o f the value o f the property, Utah law 
requires cert i f icat ion. State the Name and Licence Number o f the person who w i l l prov ide the op in ion o f 
value 
T A X R E P C O D E 
As Registered w i th the Board 
NAME: 
Appraiser License N u m b e r 
L I CONTINGENCY FEE ARRANGEMENT - Check ihiN box ,f n - m c ! pay ent to the person ot o- c:?niz.«no«» i^ based en a contingent fee and M.ue the fee 
nnanpement or agreement if >on "ant the Board to consider the cor.swltauon semcc or con»inc.ent fee appraisal as c\ idencc 
DATE 
S i ^na tu i e ol O n n r r ol p r o p e r t y p r o M d i n ^ a u t h o i i?at?on for the f \u rent. ta> \ ear (or a t t ach a l t c r n a t n c s igned a n t h m izat ior . f o r m ) 
PROPERTY OWNFRS W H O ^ N l TO APPEAL THE MARKET V - I I E SHOWN ON THE 
SALT t ARE C O U N T \ NOTICE OF PROPFRTY V A L U A T I O N A N D TAX C H A N G E ' MUST FILE A N APPEAL 
ON OR BEFORE SEPTEMBER 15 EACH VFAR OR W I T H I N FORTY F I \ F (45) DAYS OF M A I L I N G OF THE NOTICE 
THE LAST ACCEPT \ B l E FILING DATE IS PRINTED IN BOLD TYPE 1NTHF LOWER RIGHT AREA OF THE NOTICE 
IF > O U D O N O T A P P E X L O N T I M E YOU LO^E A L L RIGHTS TO APPEAL THE CURRENT V A L U E IN THE FUTURJR* 
Appeals must be Filed on this for m ^ ith all fMdence or docume?>t3tton attached 
\ separate form mint be completed for each parcel of p roper t ) appealed 
The Board of Equalization may raise, lower or maintain the market value ba^ed upon the facts presented 
The Board of Equalization cannot accept appeals in the current year for adjustment o f prior years' market values 
IPLETE ALL ITEMS RELATED TO THE APPEAL A l l Appeals to the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization must include this form 
out completely all e\ idcnce and documentation to be considered and the signature of the owner of the property Failure to raise any legal 
tual is^ue relating to the \ aluation of this properly waives the right to rai^e the issue in future proceedings Fleanng Officers appointed by 
oard of Equalization w i l l make recommendations based on the written c\ idence submitted with this appeal A Notice of Final Decision 
>c mailed to Owner of Record with an explanation of further appeal rights 
sues regarding the > alne of this propert> must be raised in this appeal and all e\idence must be submit ted w i th the Filing of this 
al and must support the >3lue as of Jan. 1, of the current )ear Appeals Filed without sufFicient e\ idence may be dismissed. The 
>sor's \ aluahon is presumed b} law to be correct Appel lant must submit enough e% idence to call the Assessor's valuation into 
fion and to establish a new -value 
P A Y M E N T OF T A X E S PLEASE N O T E C A R E F U L L Y 
nal T i \ Notice wi l l be muled to >ou bv No\cmbei I faxes " d l be due and pmable as noted on the Ta^c Notice I f you have not 
i\ed a decision b\ the due ditc you should pay the tax as bil led Failure to pay when due w i l l result in a penalty and the accrual of 
rest aN pre^enbed b\ hw \ refund w dl be issued upon Final decision, to the ow ner of record at the t ime of refund w i th interest 
suant to Counts p o b o If the property »s sold or transfer red it is the responsibility of the original petitioner to make arrangements with 
bu)cr ol the propcit\ t o rccc i \ cnn \ of the refund 
HORI7ATIONOF AGENT OR REPRESENTATIVE 
The ow nv. r ol the p iopcm mtM authorize .m\ per on or company w ho wi l l file an appeal on their behalf w ith the Salt Lake County 
Boaid ol Equabz ihon o» rcpFcccnt them m matters concerning the \ ahiation and taxation of this property They must authorize said 
agent or represenume to appe ir as a witness at any hearing of the Board and testify as to the \alue of ^aid property and the accuracy 
of am factual document it ion submitted on their behalf Appraisals prepared on a contingency fee basis may not be allowed in any 
proceeding before a count) board of equalization or the tax commission Please disclose all fee arrangements This form serves as 
juthoitzation if signed b> the ow ner I f signed by the agent a copy of an original signed authorization identifying the properties and 
specified period of time must accompany each appeal A l l Notices of Decision wi l l be mailed to the Owner of Record when issued 
A D D I T I O N A L AGENT OR REPRESENTATIVE I N F O R M A T I O N 
REQUIRED (UNLESS ON FILE A N D CURRENT W I T H THE CLERK OF THE B O A R D OF E Q U A L I Z A T I O N ) 
ME OF INDIVIDUAL OR FIRM Mr. Max M i l l e r . Parsons Behle & Latimer 
IAILING(STREET) ADDRESS P 0. Box 45898, 201 South Main S t r e e t , Su i te 1800 
c m STATE AND ZIP CODE Sal t Lake C i ty , UT 84145 TELEPHONE NUMBER (801 ) 536-6790 
ER THE I O R M IS Fl I l \ COMPl FTED A N D S I G N E D 
M M L OR D E L ! \ ER C O M P l ETFD FORMS T O 
SALT LAKF COUNTY BOARD Of EQUAL IZAT ION 
: 0 0 l S M M L M \ T*00 
S-UT LAKE C1T> I » \»! ^ 1 9 0 1100 
ILF ON OR B R O K E THF D \T E PR1N f ED IN B O L D T^ PL IN L O " E R R I G H T \ R E \ OF T H E \ X L L U T I O ^ L ^ O l l C E 
Bi ^NK F(M> N'C ^RF ^ Ml * B l L AT I HF ^ B O \ \ " DDPE^S OR THIS FORM M M P*1 DUPl IC M E D 
Rc^eij * o\ \oi'f j pp^a l r > v dl be a< know led°cd if \cm enclose a l i m p e d ^elf i dd re^ed enu lope 
M> ! 'r m oinmoil i on U > n v4^ ' !•» »I^  M l h h . l i h \ i - » n h j u \ nU d upr. i h q m <-! v Mh three ' v. ik im1 d ix ^ nonce \ T P D Jf^S ?^>M 
TabD 




Posl Office Box 4bSm 
SaltLaXeCirv I'tah 
84145 0898 
Telephone 801 532 1234 
Facsimile 80! 536-6111 
E Mail pb!(« pbhitah com 
Craig B Sorensen 
Salt Lake County Auditor 
2001 South State - N3300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1100 
Re: Notice of Appeal 
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. 
Board of Equalization Decision, April 11. 2002 
Dear Mr Sorensen 
Attached are the Notices of Appeal for each of the respective parcels involved in the 
Board of Equalization (the "Board") Decision issued April 11, 2002 Petitioner Alliant 
Techsystems, Inc ("Petitioner") acknowledges that the "final decision," from which its 
appeal is taken to the Utah State Tax Commission, is dated April 11, 2002, and that, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 59 2-1006(1), the statutorily prescribed period for an appeal 
is "within 30 days after the final action by the county board" or by May 13, 2002 
Petitioner did not file an appeal by May 13, 2002 However, this statutonly 
prescribed period is necessarily subordinate to binding constitutional "due process" that 
Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution guarantees, respectively, to citizens of the United States and Utah As defined 
by the Utah Appellate Courts, "due process is flexible and, being based on the concept of 
fairness, should afford the 'procedural protections that the given situation demands f" In re 
Worthen, 926 P 2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996) (quotations omitted), see also Rupp v Grantsville 
City, 610 P 2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980) The minimum requirements are adequate notice and 
an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner See V-l Oil Co, 939 P 2d at 1197, 
Worthen, 926 P 2d at 876, Lindon City v Engineers Constr Co, 636 P 2d 1070, 1075 
(Utah 1981) 
Under the circumstances, Petitioner did not receive "adequate notice" and a 
"meaningful opportunity" to appeal the Board's decision for the following reasons 
• The Board's "General Instructions" to "property owners" (copy attached as Exhibit 
A) state that the name, address and telephone number of the taxpayer's "additional agent or 
representatne" is "iequired " As shown in Exhibit A, the undersigned is clearly identified 












Craig B Sorensen 
July 19,2002 
Page Tv\o 
Petitioner's corporate headquarters, notwithstanding its own requirement that Petitioner list 
a local agent Further, Petitioner's undersigned agent filed pleadings, documents and other 
correspondence with the Board, and appeared and presented evidence and argument at the 
Board's hearing on December 20, 2001 Yet no notice of the Board's final decision was 
provided to the undersigned as the "required agent " 
The Board sent other notices to "The United States of America" in care of Petitioner 
at is corporate headquarters Petitioner is not the "owner" of such parcels to whom these 
notices should have been sent under the Board's own rules It is not clear why the Board 
chose to notify Petitioner, presumably as agent for the "owner," the United States of 
Ajnenca, but not notify Petitioner's counsel as agent for Petitioner Such disparate 
treatment makes no sense 
Moreover, Petitioner has never received notice from the Board of a final decision on 
four other parcels whose assessments Petitioner appealed to the Board One of the four 
parcels lists "Kermecott Utah Copper Corporation" as the owner to whom notice was sent 
The assessed value on this parcel is $102,281,500, which was adjusted to $99,184,600 
Petitioner does not know whether Kennecott ever received notice on this parcel Petitioner 
does know, however, that Kennecott did not notify Petitioner or its local counsel of any 
notice that it may have received Finally, the Board sent notice on two of the parcels 
Petitioner appealed to "Nuteam Pension and Profit Sharing Plan " To this day, the 
undersigned and designated "required" agent has not recei\ed notice of the Board's 
decision from the Board on an> parcel 
• Petitioner's prior tax representative, Mr Robert Berg, who filed the appeal of the 
Salt Lake County Assessor's 2001 tax assessment of the parcels at issue with the Board, and 
who performed similar functions over the past five years, retired before the Board issued its 
April 11, 2002 decision The department in which Mr Berg worked was restructured and 
the person succeeding to Mr Berg's responsibilities was unfamiliar with Utah procedure 
and the issues of the case The individuals at corporate headquarters assumed that a copy 
was also sent to Petitioner's identified agent since that is the practice in other states in 
which Petitioner conducts operations, and because the Board required the listing of a local 
agent 
Moreoever, there is a long history of Petitioner's tax appeals from the Board's 
decisions going back at least to 1995 with winch the Board and its counsel are intimately 
familiar, including the name and address of Petitioner's local counsel The name of 
Petitioner's counsel was prominently displa>ed on all pleadings that Petitioner filed with 
the Board ^ et neither the Board nor its counsel notified Petitioner's local counsel of the 
decision Instead, the Board sent notice of its April 11 2002 decision on most parcels to 
"Alhant Techs>stems, Jnc c/o Tax Dept MN01-3090, 5050 Lincoln Dr Edma MN " 
Petitioner behe\es that such a nondescnpt notice to corporate headquarters without 
Craig B. Sorensen 
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additional notice to those individuals specified on the pleadings is "inadequate" under the 
circumstances, and does not fairly inform Petitioner of the Board's decision so that 
"meaningful" action can be taken. 
• Petitioner's local counsel did not receive actual notice of the Board's April 11, 2002 
decision on any parcel from any source until July 16, 2002. Being concerned that he had 
heard nothing from anyone with respect to 2001 assessment appeal, Petitioner's local 
counsel inquired of the County Auditor's office to discover that a decision had been issued 
months earlier. Petitioner never had notice on the four parcels referenced above, including 
the parcel which Kennecott owns, until July 19, 2002, again because Petitioner's counsel 
took the initiative to find out the status of such matters. The Board never notified Petitioner 
of its decision on a parcel that carried almost $100 million in assessed value. 
In summary, the Board's notices are inadequate and do not provide Petitioner a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard. It would be unfair, in light of the circumstances, to 
deny Petitioner a right to appeal the Board's April 11, 2002 decision on the parcels at issue 
to the Utah State Tax Commission. Petitioner therefore respectfully requests that its appeal 
of the Board's decision be processed in the regular course of business. Petitioner also 
requests that all communications regarding this matter be sent to the undersigned counsel, 
not to Petitioner's headquarters in Minnesota, not to the United States of America, and not 
to Nuteam Pension and Profit Sharing Plan. 
Please date stamp and return to me the extra copy of the enclosed Appeals. 
Sincerely, 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
Maxwell A. Miller 
cc: Mary Ellen Sloan (via hand-delivery) 
Bill Thomas Peters (via hand-delivery) 
Judge Irene Rees? Utah State Tax Commission (via hand-delivery) 
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